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Abstract 
The economic zone of Rajin-Seonbong (Raseon) is located at the north-eastern border of 
North Korea, adjacent to China and Russia. Although its attractiveness to foreign investors 
has remained limited since its creation in 1991, Raseon is of growing interest as a transit port 
for Russian and Chinese trade. This paper reviews some theories on the constraints and 
advantages of remotely located ports, arguing that limited economic base can be overcome by 
a strategy based on transhipment flows to and from China, South Korea, Russia and Japan. In 
particular, it develops the idea that economic factors, such as remoteness from the nation‟s 
core region, are not sufficient to explain the uneven success of the project. More likely is the 
mismatch between local industries and port facilities. Unlike the Chinese free-trade zone 
experiment, port and logistics development in North Korea may take place prior to industrial 
development, strengthening Raseon as a potential gateway and growth pole in Northeast Asia.  
Keywords: DPRK; Free-trade zone; gateway; North Korea; port; Rajin-Seonbong 
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INTRODUCTION 
Several reports and studies have addressed the economical and political changes in North 
Korea in the recent years, demonstrating very diverse opinions. Some authors depict the 
reform process as “underway and probably unstoppable” (Beal, 2004) while others think that 
many of the regime‟s economic changes and diplomatic manuvers “may prove self-defeating” 
in the long run (Sandhu, 2003) or see July 2002 reforms as a survival - rather than a 
development - strategy (Yoon, 2006). North Korea is still seen as a small country with no 
natural resources (Lee, 2002), although it hosts the world‟s major sources of magnesite and 
has enormous amounts of raw materials like minerals and metals, a very big advantage over 
its Asian neighbours. Furthermore, numerous works related to Northeast Asian logistics are 
also showing contradicting forecasts of interregional trade amounts passing through North 
Korea, with or without logistic improvement or Korean reunification. From Hunchen, China 
to Niigata, Japan, passing through Rajin port would lower 10 times the distance and 2 times 
the duration compared to Dalian port, while the voyage from Japan to Europe would be 
shortened by half and third in terms of distance and time respectively compared to the 
Atlantic route (The People‟s Korea, 1997a). The “new silk road” running east through Rajin 
would lower the delivery time and cost from South Korea to Europe by 50 percent and 30 
percent respectively (Kovrigin, 2002). Not only for Chinese neighbouring provinces but also 
for Mongolia, securing sea access to the Pacific via North Korean ports is highly strategic and 
could reduce its dependence on Chinese or Russian transit ports (Batchimeg, 2006). In 
addition, the recent agreement of North Korea to end its nuclear development program in 
return of economic aid has accelerated the recognition of Rajin as a transit port. Russia is 
willing to connect Raseon‟s oil refinery to its Siberian oil and gas fields, while providing the 
zone with electricity through a joint development scheme, and China has confirmed its 
objective to link this Pacific gateway with adjacent Jilin province (Cargonews Asia, 2007). 
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On the other hand, only a very few studies at the regional and local level show how contrasted 
the North Korean territory is, although complementary research on the development of 
Nampo, North Korea‟s main port and gateway to Pyongyang, has been recently provided (Jo 
and Ducruet, 2006). Still now, the country remains very closed to the outside world and “the 
lack of a comprehensive data-gathering structure using modern economic concepts and a 
systematic reporting mechanism make quantitative assessments difficult” (Nanto and 
Chanlett-Avery, 2005). Thus, it is difficult to get a detailed and recent picture of every main 
economic centre and province.  
In this context, Rajin-Seonbong appears to be the most documented and controversial case of 
the current North Korean transition towards a market economy. However, “given the lack of 
detailed information about the internal decision-making process (…) it is difficult to analyze” 
(Kim, 2001). Following the Joint-Operation Act of 1984 and the Foreign Investment Act of 
1991, the Rajin-Seonbong Free-Trade Zone was established by the central government, 
directly attracting most of the US$134 million of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
country (Park, 2004). In 2000, the city of Rajin and the county of Seonbong were merged to 
form the new administrative unit named “Raseon.” Although it has not brought sudden 
openness to the entire North Korean economy (Noland and Flake, 1997), Raseon is the first 
capitalist experiment in the country‟s history, much inspired from the Chinese experience of 
Special Economic Zones.  
The case of Raseon demands an updated outlook for several reasons. First, the usual argument 
of geographical remoteness as a constraint to foreign investment seems not to be sufficient, 
given the worse failure of Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, created in 2002 and based 
on its good connection to communication networks and its proximity to Chinese markets, for 
political reasons. Second, the North Korean economy and trade have improved since the 
reforms of July 2002, notably with its immediate neighbours: China, Russia and South Korea. 
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Moreover, Chinese trade with North America is ever-growing and requires more direct access 
to the Pacific Ocean, to bypass the Yellow Sea ports. But also trade between China, South 
Korea, Japan, and even Europe (Rajin can be considered as a key nodal point at the end of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway), give this area a high strategic dimension for the entire region. Given 
such a perspective, the dispersed opinions must be clarified by looking at how port and 
industrial development are tied together. The Raseon case might be analysed as a case where 
political factors affect the simultaneous industrial and port growth depicted elsewhere in 
general (Takel, 1974) or in the specific context of a developing regional economy (Airriess, 
1989). This is hinted by recent studies on Raseon, explaining its relative failure by political 
instability despite more favourable tax concessions than its neighbours, including Chinese 
zones (Nam and Radulescu, 2004). Furthermore, the argument in favour of a good connection 
of ports to their national hinterland seems not working for Raseon, which generates port 
throughputs without being connected by land transport to Pyongyang area, the core market of 
the country. Then, the limitations that usually cause port activity to decline can be overcome, 
by allowing Raseon to become one of China‟s gateways and, probably, one of Northeast 
Asia‟s main entry points, instead of being North Korea‟s gateway. Unlike the Chinese case of 
Shenzhen, were industries developed before ports thanks to the proximity of the already 
existing Hong Kong hub, port and logistic improvement in North Korea must happen before 
industrial development. By doing so, the FTZ project can get the recognition it failed to gain 
from foreign investors, at a time when factors of uncertainty combined dramatically with 
technical inadequacies and hampered the project.  
In this respect, a number of questions need to be answered by referring to the previous 
literature on the relationship between ports and development. Since industrial location and 
central place theories related to North Korea have been discussed elsewhere (Lee, 2001), this 
paper proposes an overlook of Raseon through two other sets of theories: the spatial and 
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functional development model of the “remote nodal gateway” (Stern and Hayuth, 1984), and a 
theory on the “lock-in effect” of centralized urban systems (Fujita and Mori, 1996). The 
interesting fact concerning Raseon, is its unconnectedness with its national core region, but its 
growing linkages with an external exporting area, the Chinese province of Jilin (Cotton, 
1996a).  
The first section of this paper reviews the theories on the economic development of remote 
ports. The second section addresses the background of Raseon FTZ in the context of North 
Korea‟s gradual opening to trade and foreign investment. Then, a third section focuses on the 
potential of Raseon in terms of labour supply, port infrastructure and trade activity with 
neighbouring countries, together with a specific analysis of cargo vessel movements between 
1985 and 2005 at Rajin port. Finally, the last section addresses some policy implications 
about the possible future of Raseon as a new pole in Northeast Asia.  
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AT REMOTELY LOCATED PORTS 
General characteristics of port nodes 
Although it is true that ports, like any other transport infrastructure, may encourage economic 
development, through agglomeration and scale economies (Bird, 1977), the growing 
complexity of transport players‟ strategies has dramatically questioned the systematic 
relationship between port activity, local economy and hinterland proximity, due to other 
factors such as port competition and land-sea accessibility (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005).  
Furthermore, the level of traffic “is, at least in part, a reflection of the quality of the city‟s 
location.” It combines the two dimensions of centrality – the hub city‟s own traffic-generation 
power that comes from its size and function as well as its location – and intermediacy – extra 
activity levels conveyed to the hub by the carrier‟s choice of this location for operational 
geographical emphasis within their transportation systems (Fleming and Hayuth, 1994). It 
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means that a port, for example, can induce traffic despite the absence of a hinterland and local 
industry, if transport players decide to include this location in their network to facilitate 
shipping between other trading regions or even other ports. Among the different types of port 
cities synthesized by Ducruet (2004) in the port-city matrix, gateways and hubs have in 
common a higher intermediacy (Figure 1). Gateways are subdued to remote markets and 
develop few activities apart from heavy industry and logistics (e.g. Le Havre, Genoa, 
Rotterdam), while hubs are dominated by transport functions (e.g. Gioia Tauro, Freeport, 
Salalah), and outports are gateways of close cities (e.g. Bremerhaven / Bremen, Belawan / 
Medan, Sepetiba / Rio de Janeiro). Those three types have in common a strong intermediacy 
but a limited centrality. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The distance to core regions 
Two sets of theories help to balance the simple effect of distance on the developmental effects 
of ports. First, the geopolitically located port model defined by Stern and Hayuth (1984) as a 
port isolated and remote from the population and economic centres of its country. Compared 
to a conventional port system, such a port develops in four stages, based on the cases of 
Aqaba (Jordan) and Eilat (Israel): 
- remote nodal gateway: serving directly and only the national economic core restricts 
the activity to the port function, without leading to any development effects on the port 
city and its vicinity, nor to any emergence of a proper hinterland; 
- functional gateway: market expansion at the economic core and its immediate 
periphery, but the gateway remains unaffected despite the growth of cargo; 
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- transit gateway: national strategy of profit-maximisation and diversification of traffics 
due to the inclusion of in-transit cargo shipments, turning the relationship between the 
core and the gateway into a two-way linkage; 
- integrated transhipment system: improvement of transport between core and gateway 
(e.g., intermodal links), but the latter still suffers from remoteness and the lack of 
human resources. Only limited intra-urban activity growth is observed, with very few 
peripheral effects on the gateway‟s surroundings.  
 
The details of Rajin-Seonbong indicate that it would correspond to such a case, given its 
remoteness and its limited urban and industrial growth in the last decades. However, a main 
difference with the model is the lack of relation between the Pyongyang capital region and 
Raseon (Figure 2). Rail transport would take two or three days between the two areas, and 
road transport is almost unthinkable given the poor transport conditions, in a country where 
93 percent of roads are unpaved (Bang, 2004). The mountainous barrier between East and 
West is only overcome by railways, the dominant transport mode of the country (Oh, 2001) 
since logistics costs hamper truck voyages (Roussin and Ducruet, 2006). While remoteness 
from Pyongyang can be seen as both economically negative and politically positive for the 
zone (Kim, 2001), former studies have neglected the role of intermediacy among macro-
regional factors. Furthermore, distance to bigger ports and trading regions is not a constraint 
but an advantage in the strategy of developing transhipment or load centre functions, as in the 
challenge of peripheral ports depicted by Hayuth (1981).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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In a more developed but comparable environment, the Baltic ports attempt to overcome their 
remoteness to European core regions by catching transit trade with Russia. For example, 
recent figures show that Riga, Latvia, has seen its share of Russian transhipment cargo among 
total cargo rising from 10 percent in 1991 to 40 percent in 1995 and 50 percent in 1996. The 
same phenomenon happened in Tallinn, Estonia, with a share of 45 percent in 1995 and 70 
percent in 1996, and has been slighter in Klaipeda, Lithuania, as the share stagnated around 
20 percent of the port‟s total throughput (Thorez, 1998). Such trends can be explained by the 
need for Baltic port cities to diversify their traffics, to bypass the limitations of inland 
transport systems and to find external forces that can be an engine to induce local economic 
development. As a result, most industrial parks in the Baltic States have been created around 
port areas like Ventspils, Liepaja, Riga, Tallinn and Klaipeda.  
Fujita and Mori (1996) note that “in many developing countries (such as Indonesia and 
Thailand), although their governments have striven to decentralize industry to the periphery, 
the lock-in effect of existing primate cities (which are mostly port cities) has been so strong 
that their efforts have been unsuccessful.” In particular, the authors indicate that the 
improvement of transport connections between the centre (i.e., Pyongyang) and the periphery 
(i.e., Raseon) may be harmful to the industrial development of the latter, especially if the 
remote port city has not developed any specific and competitive industry. Raseon stands far 
behind other ports in terms of proximity to mines and natural resources, apart from the largest 
coal field of the country, which occupies almost 50 percent of North Hamgyeong province 
(Wu, 2004). Only the worsening of the transport connection might allow the peripheral port to 
develop thanks to “self-reinforcing agglomeration economies.” Pyongyang is not a port but a 
continental core connected to the sea only by the Daedong River, where navigation is limited 
to small barges carrying raw bulky products like sand. In this respect, the absence of sufficient 
linkages between the core and the periphery may help ports, as in such perspective “the 
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advantages of water-transport (…) shift the larger cities from the centre of the region to points 
on the periphery” (Smolensky and Ratajczak, 1965).  
 
ADVANTAGES AND CONSTRAINTS OF RASEON FTZ 
Background and economic performance 
The Free Economic and Trade Zone of Rajin-Seonbong was planned by the 74
th
 decision of 
the Administration Council of North Korea on 28 December, 1991. Because independence 
and self-suffiency were not inconsistent with foreign trade, the former leader Kim Il-Seong 
chose Rajin-Seonbong as a first experiment of an open door policy (Cotton, 1996b). 
Motivation from the central government was based on the inefficiency of its own economic 
strategies and production system, the shortage of foreign currency, the successful experience 
of China and the sudden isolation provoked by the disruption of trade with the former Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s (Nam and Radulescu, 2004). Rajin-Seonbong also appears as a key 
element of the Tumen River Project from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
which aims at enhancing regional cooperation between neighbouring states and provinces. 
Covering 746 sq m since its enlargement in 1993, it is one of the planned „growth centres‟ 
with the Russian port of Posyet and the Chinese open city of Hunchen. In this context, “the 
DPRK is the most avid proponent of [the project] since they are unwilling to cede any of their 
territory to an internationally managed zone” (Marton et al., 1995).  
It has been reported that among the 113 registered companies in 1998 operating in the zone, 
67 remained in 2000 of which 20 were Japanese. The total FDI flows (see Table 1) reached an 
amount of $US 88 million in 1998, accounting for almost 9 percent of the total investment in 
the Tumen River Area (excluding Mongolia). Despite the Asian financial crisis, which 
apparently affected Chinese and Russian FDI flows, Raseon has increased its share since 
1997. However by 1999, the amount of FDI represented only 10 percent of the original 
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contract, mostly from China, Hong Kong and Japan (Lee, 2002). Other indicators in Table 1 
all point at the sudden increase in GDP and trade since 1999. However, this trend is not well 
reflected by official port statistics in which traffics are rather stagnating along the period. 
There is no equivalent evolution of trade volumes and port traffics. Two reasons are proposed: 
the landward character of trade, and the little adequacy between port functions and local 
industries. The dominance of China and of imports shows that instead of using the port as a 
catalyser, major developments in Raseon are more likely to be oriented towards China itself 
through road and rail transport. This is hinted by local observers which consider inland 
container traffic - 3,000 boxes in 1997 - with neighboring cities (e.g. Hunchen, Tumen) as 
crucial (The People‟s Korea, 1997b). In addition, China applies preferential treatment: 
“products that were processed in the Rajin area with Chinese materials and then imported to 
China, for instance, were labelled domestic trade and were thus exempted from customs 
inspection” (Kim, 2006).  
In terms of port capacity, the port of Rajin is ranging from 3 to 3.5 million tons of trade, but 
its current throughput is said to be less than 10 percent of its capacity (Tumen River Area 
Development Programme, 2006). Despite a limited activity, Raseon is well equipped on a 
national level in terms of port infrastructure and capacity. However, the specialisation of 
Rajin port, based on coals, fertilizers, timber, and sundries is not well matched with a local 
economy focused on seafood, food processing, construction, real estate, tourism, and 
transport, since the economic zone has been launched. Available information on Rajin and 
Seonbong ports much reflect the pre-Raseon period defined by the priority to heavy industries 
and bulk products, which is reflected in the poor level of cargo handling facilities. Seonbong 
port is more specialised in petrochemical products and crude oil imports, with 3.2km-long 
undersea pipelines connected to Seungri Chemical Co., Seonbong Thermal Power Plant and a 
floating oil dock (Asia Trade Hub, 2006). Seonbong‟s economy is also much linked to energy, 
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with uranium mine and a 200-megawatt oil-fired power plant, an oil refinery and an electric 
power plant. In fact, transit trade has been dominant at Raseon ports since the 1960s, handling 
Russian cargoes from Vladivostok and Nakhodka to Japan and Southeast Asia, such as 
fertilizers, marine products, and redirecting steel pipes, general cargoes and raw aluminium 
materials from Japan, Australia to Russia (Han, 2006). This may explain why the local 
economy has little to do with traditional port activities. Conversely, most recent investments 
show the weak linkages between local industries and the port (Table 2), as already stated by 
UN official Ian Davies, head of the Tumen project: “we would have liked to have seen more 
contracts signed in the manufacturing sector” (Lee, 1996). This is confirmed by Kim (2006) 
that “the sectors in which China invested have heretofore focused on service” although more 
attention has been recently drawn upon manufacturing, mining, and energy. Among the 
industries in Raseon that may use the port for exporting their products, most are concerned 
with small cargo volumes (e.g. fish and marine products), while other industries are mostly 
services and retail.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Spatial constraints at local and national levels 
Next table gives a synthesis of the urban and port characteristics of the two local units, Rajin 
and Seonbong (Table 3). Figures are collected from a vast amount of different publications 
but the housing units have been counted by the authors from a geographical atlas. Such a 
synthesis allows understanding the potentials and relative importance of Raseon.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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When comparing the two profiles of Rajin and Seonbong according to housing capacity, it 
appears that the status of Rajin as a city is reflected in the higher proportion of high density 
housing, and the number of rural-type units are higher for Seonbong. Thus, the urban centre 
of Raseon is Rajin itself. Furthermore, the settlement pattern of the two city-regions shows 
that Rajin, with 95 percent of housing units in the core area, is much more compact than 
Seonbong, which has only 77 percent. It is partly an effect of the site, because Rajin is much 
more constrained than Seonbong.  
Thus, the potential sites for the expansion of port and industrial facilities are scarce in Rajin 
and quite important in Seonbong (Figure 3), as indicated in Table 3. The advantage however 
is that the most important sites for industrial development are located on both sides of the 
tunnel, close to the satellite neighbourhood of Unjakgu (Rajin) and the district of 
Namgwandong (Seonbong), what can facilitate the communication and interaction between 
the two locations. Then, the tunnel itself should be maintained and secured for regular truck 
transport.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In addition, Raseon‟s share of population among other North Korean port cities is relatively 
low, due to the very limited natural growth and strong institutional control of in-migrations 
(Figure 4). Population figures are difficult to interpret in North Korea due to the very 
controlled dimension of migration and transportation, and to the recent famines that lowered 
population considerably, especially in areas remote from Pyongyang. As it is a border area 
and a port, Raseon is highly strategic and the North Korean government and the army might 
have reduced to a minimum the working population in the area, and constrained the “natural” 
effect of the gateway‟s self-agglomeration (e.g. rural exodus). On a national scale, the closest 
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cities to Pyongyang, namely Nampo and Songrim, which are also ports, enjoyed the highest 
demographic growth, and closely followed by the port city of Haeju and the city of Sariwon. 
Away from the capital region, only the city of Sinuiju and the port city of Cheongjin show 
important growth during that period. Rajin remains a small coastal town where the FTZ 
project and the port activity still haven‟t been able to enhance the city size and functions, or 
act as a growth pole.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
One should not forget a wider phenomenon affecting the whole country. Most urban centres 
in North Korea have suffered from the decline in production from 60% of the economy in 
1987 to 27% in 2002, and from the reduction of the factories‟ industrial capacity around 20-
30%. Domestic transport activity concentrates the most in South Pyongan (30%), North 
Hamgyeong of which Raseon (24%), South Hamgyeong (17%) and North Pyongan (10%) 
provinces, and 80% of North Korea‟s exports pass through Sinuiju at the border with China 
(Tsuji, 2005). In fact, freight transport activity in North Korea is concentrated in the major 
port regions of the country: the Nampo-Pyongyang corridor (South Pyeongan) and the 
Raseon-Cheongjin area (North Hamgyeong).  
As a result, Raseon is North Korea‟s most dependent area on port activity and maritime trade, 
according to the relative concentration index used by Ducruet and Lee (2006) on the world‟s 
port cities. The index is calculated as follows: the percentage of foreign trade divided by the 
percentage of population among the total of the port cities. It shows the relative situation of 
port cities in both urban and port systems. Nampo, Haeju, Cheongjin, and Heungnam have a 
balanced profile (values close to „1‟), Songrim and Wonsan have a lower port function (values 
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under „1‟), and Raseon is comparatively an unusual case, with the enormous importance of 
port functions compared to other functions.  
 
A synthesis of pros and cons 
In both comparison tables of Kim (2000) and Lee (2001) about the characteristics of possible 
investment areas in North Korea, Raseon is ranked seventh among eight. Transportation, 
agglomeration effect and labour quantity were described as the limiting factors while raw 
material provision is the only factor exceeding average scores. Again, explanations are funded 
on deterministic factors such as remoteness and altitude.  
Table 4 shows a synthesis of the factors explaining the current state of Raseon‟s economy. Its 
natural conditions are favourable, and its location fits the profile of a transit port (or 
transhipment port) using other neighbouring countries‟ freight for its own activity. Raseon is 
not limited by railway standards, and the quality of roads is currently being improved for 
trucking with Hunchen, China. A new logistics-free zone is under way at Namyang (Rank, 
2006), following rail access improvements with the electrification of 168 km of tracks, and 
the construction of a marshalling yard for handling containers to and from the zone as 70% of 
its traffic is made by trains (Kim, 2001). The advantages provided by the FTZ seem not to be 
in accordance with the quality of existing industries, and it would have needed considerable 
effort to improve them or to create new industrial sites. In a recessive context, combined with 
a highly competitive environment in Asia, investors have preferred to locate in other export 
platforms offering even slightly higher wages or lower incentives, but where the infrastructure 
and industrial facilities are operational. For Raseon, the gap between the means and the 
objective has been the main barrier to its success (Asian Political News, 2001). Remoteness is 
a minor factor which can be easily overcome in an age of global logistics. As stated by Kim 
(2001), the combination of negative factors has turned potential investors away from the zone 
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to the alternative destinations of Hunchen and Primorsky. A look at available statistics is thus 
necessary to help understanding how port functions are likely to improve Raseon‟s status as a 
gateway.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
STRATEGIES FOR RASEON AS A NORTHEAST ASIAN GATEWAY 
Trade evolution and port activities 
The general foreign trade pattern of North Korea (Table 5) clearly indicates the growth of the 
relationships with China, which has reached a dominant share (39 percent), far beyond South 
Korea (26 percent). This is a positive trend for Raseon, together with the trade with Russia, 
which has doubled between 2001 and 2004, and slightly decreased then.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Unfortunately, there is not much information available about Raseon‟s detailed trade activity 
and share in the trade with China. Trade figures between North Hamgyeong province and 
China show a growth and decline in tremendous proportions: from 3.7% to 21.6% and to 
4.8%. The impact of Raseon has fallen short in enhancing DPRK trade, which is more likely 
to originate from other areas of the country. Although it does not distinguish between North 
Pyongan (Sinuiju) and North Hamgyeong, border trade with China has grown up regularly 
since 2003: 6.3%, 8.4% and 10.9% of total DPRK trade respectively. Jilin province is ranking 
behind Liaoning - border trade with Sinuiju - for North Korean exports since 2001, but its 
share in North Korean imports is slightly higher and more regular. North Hamgyeong 
province may have become an import area rather than an export area in the recent years.  
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The modal distribution of trade volumes to and from Raseon or North Hamgyeong province is 
not known. Little information exists about the main sea routes linked to Rajin port but 
detailed traffic statistics remains very scarce. Since 1995, it was reported that a shipping line 
was moving Chinese containerised cargo abroad through Rajin, as well as some fertiliser 
brought by rail from Russia, using a multipurpose terminal. Chinese interests are also 
reflected in the leasing of Rajin‟s second pier to China for 80 years (Ming, 2003). But still, 
the regular shipping route established in 1999 with the Japanese port of Akita is “dormant 
[and has] only irregular services, mainly due to a lack of cargo” (Tsuji, 2003). Nevertheless, 
maritime trade between Rajin and Busan, South Korea, has continued since the opening of 
this route in 1995, with 4,000 to 5,000 TEUs
1
 of cargo being handled annually, but it 
competes with the neighbouring ferry service between Sokcho, South Korea, and Zarubino, 
Russia. As a result, if the number of containers handled at Rajin port is far below the capacity 
of 30,000, container throughput is constantly increasing: 2,867 in 1996, 3,161 in 1997 and 
2,828 in the first half of 1998 for the most recent figures available (The People‟s Korea, 
1998). However, any data provided by official announcements should be cautiously used. 
Unrealistic figures depicting the 300 million tons capacity of the port since 2000 with the 17 
quay cranes (Han, 2006), and the creation of a 30,000 TEUs capacity resulting from foreign 
investment (Korean Central News Agency, 1998) have not yet been proved.  
More accurate data can be obtained from the Ministry of Unification in South Korea, but it is 
limited to North-South trade and only for some years. As shown in Figure 5, Rajin has the 
highest share of north to south trade (80 percent). It means that it is the port where shipments 
from the south, mostly humanitarian, are the lowest, because of a limited population, and thus 
indicates that Rajin‟s function within Korean trade is to handle transhipment cargo from other 
countries to South Korea. Other ports having the same profile only handle limited cargoes. 
                                                 
1
 Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, standard measure of container throughput 
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This pattern, although it is susceptible to change every year, gives some clue about the 
function of the ports in the national and regional economy. Conversely, the dominance of 
south-north shipments indicates that these ports are importing goods for their local and 
regional economy, and are located close to industrial areas and urban settlements (e.g., 
Nampo, Songrim, Haeju, Heungnam, Sinpo, Cheongjin), with the exception of Seonbong, 
which is used for oil imports. Thus, Rajin‟s profile appears to be more extraverted, fitting the 
definition of the remote gateway: a dominant transhipment function and a relative absence of 
proper industries. Although data about the type of goods which have been shipped from Rajin 
to Busan and Ulsan are lacking, one can extrapolate that goods are mostly of Chinese and 
Russian origin, because of the limited industrial base of Raseon. This can be partly solved by 
looking at the types and capacities of the cargo vessels calling at Rajin in the last two decades.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Cargo vessel traffics in Northeast Asia 
Although they do not perfectly illustrate the real amount of tons handled at Rajin port, data on 
cargo vessels provided by Lloyd‟s, a leading maritime insurance company registering 
approximately 80% of the world‟s fleet, allow a good overview of the different trends 
affecting the gateway (Table 6). Ship capacities in deadweight tons (DWT) have been 
summed on a yearly basis and distributed according to the type, volume, origin and 
destination of the cargoes.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
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At first glance, Rajin has never been a leading port in North Korea. Its relative capacity on a 
national scale has only exceeded 7% during the three years following the operation of Rajin-
Seonbong FTZ (1992-1994). After a period of decline, it is only since 2003 that the relative 
weight of Rajin has gone back to its original level of the mid-1980s: around 3%, although 
absolute figures remain lower.  
The question is to evaluate which of the two following factors underlie traffic variations: 
uneven success of the FTZ itself or wider political trends such as transition between two 
presidencies. In a more opened environment such as transition or new industrialized countries, 
traffic growth would have been sustained due to the absence of major obstacles once the 
economic zone is launched. Technical and logistics factors would improve gradually after the 
first investments. In the case of Raseon and DPRK, 1994 might not only mean the loss of 
investors due to persisting local difficulties, but the political crisis after the death of former 
president Kim Il-Sung. During the three following years, his son Kim Jeong-Il has fought 
hard against the army and the cabinet in order to gain recognition. Not only this difficult 
transition has affected ongoing projects such as Rajin-Seonbong, but it has been worsened by 
other priorities due to nuclear crisis, floods, and famines between 1994 and 1996.  
Before 1991, traffics are dominantly general cargoes, but it seems that the operation of the 
FTZ has necessitated importing large amounts of solid bulks (e.g. cements, construction 
materials) in order to realize the project. Since 1995, traffics have gone back to the dominance 
in general cargoes. Although they have existed between 1988 and 1990, conventional cargoes 
have really increased since 2004, as a possible illustration of the realization of Chinese transit 
trade. However, Chinese trade is land-based and can only be reflected indirectly by the 
figures. Container traffics measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) also show the 
sudden drop since 1994, which has not yet been recovered.  
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Another important feature of Rajin‟s traffics is the decreasing size of ships since 1994. Thus, 
most cargoes are being shipped on the smallest vessels (i.e. less than 4,500 tons). It 
undoubtedly reflects the deterioration of port infrastructures combined to the decrease of 
regular shipping lines. More likely are irregular and small shipments in the recent years. Such 
evidence seriously infirm official announcements about the 200,000 tons vessels to be 
accommodated of which 36 could be berthed at the same time (Korean News, 1997).  
The geographical distribution of the traffics (Figure 6) essentially shows the disappearance of 
Chinese maritime trade with Rajin since 1997, and the recent increase of traffics with Russia, 
at the expense of Japanese cargoes. The first years of FTZ (1991-1994) illustrate the greater 
diversity of partners, with South Korea and Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, 
which have not been much connected to Rajin port before and after this period. As shown in 
the map, the regional foreland of Rajin port has constantly retracted from one period to 
another. Most traffic is realized to and from closest ports (Japan, Russia) while other Chinese 
ports, Hong Kong, and also Singapore have dramatically reduced.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the scarcity of data, it has been possible to estimate the role of Raseon in North 
Korean and North-South trade and transportation. In terms of industrial outputs, the economy 
of Raseon has not been able to cope with the needs of foreign investors, in a context of tense 
relationships with neighbours, especially after the succession of Kim Il-Seong and the 
increase of ideological and military concerns. This paper has attempted to clarify the limiting 
factors affecting the development of a free trade zone in a constrained economy. It argues that 
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the demise of the project is explained by a combination of functional and political factors 
rather than by the inherent demerits of the zone or its remoteness to core economic areas.  
Functional factors refer to local linkages between different activities. The evolution of port 
traffics reveals that Rajin port has mostly been used for starting the project in the early 1990s, 
but since then traffics have been stagnant and irregular. While this is seen as a result of 
technical lacks of port infrastructures and handling facilities, we argue that the main reason is 
the weak functional linkages between the free trade zone and the port. Investors and planners 
have not seen the port as a catalyser for their development. Tax exemption has been the main 
reason to invest in the zone, regardless of a long-term strategy. Thus the port, although it was 
not yet perfectly adapted to global technical standards in the early 1990s, could have 
enhanced trade growth and long distance connections if more manufacturing companies were 
settled there, like in other developing countries. However, due to this mismatch between 
service activities (e.g. hotels, casino, and telecommunications) and the port, the latter has not 
been able to act as an engine for industrial development. Its role has remained limited to 
secondary activities such as seafood exports.  
Political factors concern the relationship between investors and North Korean officials. 
Investors would not have been suddenly discouraged after a few years of operation since basic 
requirements were provided. In fact, the sudden disrupts since 1994 shows that urgent 
political and first aid matters have taken precedence over the capitalist experiment. It has 
become rapidly more difficult to restart the project on growingly unstable grounds and ageing 
infrastructures. It definitely depreciates the deterministic argument on the low economic 
profitability due to accessibility and connectedness. Moreover, ten years after the creation of 
the Rajin-Seonbong FTZ, the demise of Sinuiju SAR proved that the remoteness of Raseon 
was not the main factor limiting its development. Although Raseon hasn‟t emerged yet as an 
industrial growth pole, its port activity has been steady despite the absence of a hinterland and 
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a local economic base. At the end, Raseon‟s role is better described as a connecting point 
between regional economies, rather than a gateway for its own province and country.  
Regarding Stern and Hayuth‟s model of the remote gateway, Raseon surely matches with the 
developmental stages described: limited effects of port activity on the local and regional 
economy, and growth of transit trade to serve outlying regions rather than its own hinterland, 
which is absent or limited to one type of material (coal). However, the model does not match 
the case of Raseon entirely because the main region served is not the core region of the 
country. Then, Raseon is not the gateway of North Korea (or Pyongyang) but the gateway of 
Far-East regions, competing with Russian ports to serve East Sea and Pacific trade. Such a 
situation can be compared to some Baltic ports like Tallinn, Riga and Klaipeda, whose 
activity is mostly coming from Russian transit trade to and from Western Europe, due to 
inland freight constraints and a limited national market in a context of transition (Brodin, 
2003).  
Regarding Fujita and Mori‟s theory of the lock-in effect of urban systems on port cities, it 
appears that the distance to Pyongyang and the very limited connectedness between 
Pyongyang and Raseon did not produce self-agglomeration effects in terms of demographic 
and economic growth. Here, political factors are crucial and have constrained the 
development of the FTZ, despite the efforts to implement a capitalist enclave at a time when 
even economic reforms were still unthinkable. Thus, the continuous growth of Raseon‟s port 
and logistic function seems to be the only way to make this place attractive to foreign 
investment, and the vision of Raseon as a growth pole resulting from FTZ incentives should 
be left aside in a first stage.  
Looking back in time, the FTZ project should have been less ambitious and focused on pure 
logistics instead of aiming at creating a favourable business environment without much 
evidence of the place‟s ability to trade. One should notice that up to 1998, hotel business and 
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tourism occupied 35% of Raseon‟s FDI, but the casino has since been deserted by its Chinese 
customers. By basing its development on the port function, Raseon could follow the 
“traditional” port city evolution, with a gradually diversification of its economy, from a port 
city to an industrial city and to a general city (Murphey, 1989). Such process may not be 
hampered by competition from neighbouring Cheongjin, a bigger port city, given the recent 
observations about its dramatic situation
2
. However, in a constrained country like North 
Korea, where political factors are critical and complex, the provision of a free-trade 
environment is not sufficient. In particular, the success of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, 
close to the South Korean border, can be explained by lesser military concerns - Gaeseong is 
an inland city, not a port - and by the direct involvement of South Korean public and private 
players in implementing the zone. For the Shenzhen case in China, the role of Hong Kong has 
been crucial to the success of the zone for other foreign investors, in terms of technology 
transfer and logistic improvement. For Raseon, Pyongyang is still not able to induce such 
development from inside. Thus, the strategy based on Chinese transhipment and, further, 
Northeast Asian transit trade appears to turn the remoteness of Raseon into an advantage. Not 
only it is the only advantage of Raseon, until North Korean development itself reaches further 
stages, but also its status as a free port enjoying good natural conditions strengthens its 
intermediacy - and thus, competitiveness - in assuming a gateway function. For Raseon, only 
a regular and growing trade can provide a fertile ground for further economic growth, by 
bringing back the confidence of foreign investors to the FTZ itself.  
 
                                                 
2
 As observed by UN official Tun Myat in 1997: “Chongjin was like a forest of scrap metal, with huge plants 
that seem to go on for miles and miles that have been turned into rust buckets. I've been all over the world, and 
I've never seen anything quite like this”.  
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Table 1: Official statistics on Raseon‟s economic performance, 1993-2003 
Year 
FDI  
Firms 
start-ups 
GDP 
(Mil. KRW) 
Trade 
(Mil. USD) 
Tourist flows 
Port transit traffic 
(000s) 
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1993 1 0.5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1994 1 1.5 - - 239 89 46 5.8 3.9 - - - - - - 
1995 4 2.9 - - 182 69 37 4.9 3.4 13.5 1.83 97.5 - - - 
1996 31 11.8 - - 165 61 23 4.8 3.1 14.8 2.62 97.5 446 - - 
1997 26 12.0 - - 154 49 27 5.0 3.6 17.9 2.94 98.0 248 - - 
1998 25 19.5 20 95 155 51 24 4.9 3.4 18.4 3.22 98.0 240 - - 
1999 - - 16 50 826 - - 7.5 22.6 19.5 3.51 - 245 6.0 83.6 
2000 - - 11 90 913 - - 5.9 22.4 22.9 4.12 - 252 6.0 84.3 
2001 - - 16 87 1072 - - 13.1 - 27.8 5.28 - 274 6.2 87.1 
2002 - - 3 100 1415 - - 9.2 15.7 35.2 6.69 - 282 6.3 87.7 
2003 - - 11 72 1405 - - 13.4 21.7 34.1 6.50 - 290 - - 
Source: compiled from United Nations Development Programme (2006) 
 
Table 2: Summary of investments in Raseon, 1996-2004 
Country Sector 
Amount 
(000s USD) 
Share 
(%) 
China 
Commerce, services, tourism 19,518 
23.6 Manufacturing 17,832 
Transit trade 3,234 
Japan 
Seafood processing & export 949 
1.8 
Commercial services 2,256 
Hong Kong 
Hotel & services 59,000 
37.1 
Road construction 4,839 
Taiwan Tobacco processing 2,096 1.2 
Australia Goat farm & general services 1,310 0.7 
Singapore Seafood 1,009 0.6 
Thailand Telecom 26,880 15.6 
Other 32,967 19.1 
Total 171,890 100.0 
Type 
Number of 
businesses 
Real investment 
rate (%) 
Amount 
(000s USD) 
Share 
(%)* 
Wholly foreign owned business 34 40 85,225 100.0 
Equity joint venture 47 70 27,325 50.6 
Contractual joint venture 17 33 36,392 60.9 
Local business 48 98 22,948 0.0 
Total 146 45** 171,890 70.5 
Source: compiled from United Nations Development Programme (2006) 
* Percentages refer to the share of foreign inflows in each category 
** Value refer to average 
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Table 3: Urban and port characteristics of Rajin and Seonbong 
 Type Rajin Seonbong % DPRK 
Number of housing 
units 
Rural type housing (1 floor) 348 458 6.5 
Low density housing (2-3 floors) 504 509 6.7 
High density housing (5-6 floors) 145 115 3.7 
Total 997 1,082 6.0 
Spatial distribution 
of housing units 
(%) 
City centre 36.1 28.6 5.0 
2 km 49.2 33.5 3.6 
4 km 6.6 20.6 0.9 
6 km 8.0 10.4 1.8 
8 km 0.0 6.9 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 6.0 
Population 
Official (2005) 77,000 27,000 4.1 
Estimated (1997) 64,912 18,912 5.2 
Potential industrial 
sites (km
2
) 
Inner city 5.8 12.4 30.1 
Total 8.6 24.4 9.2 
Quay length (m) 
Minima 2,280 456 26.3 
Maxima 4,340 2,515 24.7 
Quay depth (m)* 
Minima 10 7 13.2 
Maxima 11 23 8.1 
Handling facilities Number of quay cranes 1 0 0.3 
Capacity 
(000s tons) 
Stevedoring 3,000 2,000 16.9 
Berth 15 5 16.6 
Traffic 3,225 3,710 19.8 
Port-city relative concentration index 
(% traffic capacity / % population) 
3.0 10.0 4.9 
Source: Asia Trade Hub (2006); Atlas of North Korea (1997); Helders (2006) 
* DPRK value refer to country average 
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Table 4: Advantages and constraints of the Raseon FTZ 
 Constraints Advantages 
S
o
ci
al
 
O
v
er
h
ea
d
 
C
ap
it
al
 * Isolation and lack of facilities 
* Precedence of geo-political logic over geo-
economic logic causing poor performance 
* Lack of knowledge and management skills 
* Border trade and potential for DPRK‟s 
balanced development 
* Potential integration to Europe-Asia land bridge 
* Regular training sessions of DPRK officials 
about capitalist economy 
In
d
u
st
ri
al
 
B
as
e
 
Unattractive industry to foreign investors 
(backwardness, outdated industrial technology 
and skills, lack of energy and raw materials to 
run the plants, logistics costs for distribution of 
finished products) 
* Economic diversity: seafood, food processing, 
construction, real estate, tourism, transport, 
energy, oil refinery, chemicals 
* Large traditional mining area (iron, coal, 
copper) and raw material natural resources 
(timber, gravel, sand) 
O
p
en
n
es
s 
* Unstable attitude of DPRK‟s regime towards the 
outside world (e.g. investment protection 
treaties) 
* Juche ideology and protectionism 
* Confidentiality of DPRK practices to hamper 
inter-port regional cooperation 
Income tax exemption to foreign firms: 
* 14% in general and 10% for certain high-tech 
activities 
* 50% to 100% during  the 3 years following first 
profit within 10-years operation 
E
x
te
rn
al
 L
in
k
ag
es
 –
 E
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 * Remoteness from DPRK‟s core region (19h by 
train, out of reach by road) 
* Frequent truck accidents in northern mountainous 
and coastal roads 
* Absence of tunnels to reach Wonjong 
* Only 10% of port capacity in operation 
* Outdated port infrastructures 
* Absence of a close core economic center like Hong 
Kong 
* Absence of air transport linkages 
* Isolation from neighbouring bigger ports 
* Transit trade caught by rival Russian ports due to 
lack of capacity and poor infrastructure 
* Highway development to link Hunchen city 
* Only ice-free port in the region, good nautical 
accessibility 
* Mixed standard and broad gauges (Russian 
standard) for railways 
* Improved road connection to Jilin province via 
Wonjong free market (50 km) 
* Express cargo train between Rajin and 
Namyang (1997) 
* Opening of new container lines projected by 
the inter-Korean maritime agreement (2004) 
M
ar
k
et
 S
ca
le
 a
n
d
 P
ro
sp
ec
t 
* Small population of 150,000 inhabitants 
* Limited workforce basin; recruitment is regulated 
by DPRK and restricted geographically 
* Scarcity of land for new industrial areas (forests, 
swamps, lakes, mountains 75%, cultivated 13%, 
water 7.5%, industrial 2.5%, residential 2%) 
* Over 50% of investments to transportation and 
tourism between 1992 and 1996 
* Project of a logistics free-zone at Namyang for 
China, ROK and Japan companies 
* Leasing and development of container terminals 
to China for 25-80 years for transit trade 
* Raseon International Logistics Joint Company 
created in 2005 with exclusive rights to run 3
rd
 
and 4
th
 piers of Rajin port for 50 years 
* Industrial park of 5-10 sq km from Chinese 
investment (36 million USD) with tourism and 
road facilities underway 
P
ro
sp
ec
ts
 f
o
r 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
* Persistence of a “Soviet model” of economic 
development - preference to heavy industries 
and lack of investment in transport and logistics 
* Historical antagonism since Japanese occupation 
harming regional cooperation 
* Competition from other North Korean zones and 
existing Asian export platforms offering low 
wages and high investment incentives 
* Local - regional - national negative multiplier 
effects within DPRK 
* Trade embargo from the US, UN sanctions 
against nuclear tests 
* Part of the UNDP project for Tumen River 
Area Development Program since 1992 
* Positive experience of Gaeseong Industrial 
Park financed by South Korea and growing 
since 2004 (10,000 workers in 15 companies 
in 2006) 
* Failure of Sinuiju SAR due to politics despite a 
more favourable environment than Raseon 
* Economic reforms applied to the entire 
economy since July 2002 
* Restart of the 6-party talks since Feb. 2007 
Source: adapted from Kim (2000) and various sources 
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Table 5: North Korean foreign trade, 1991-2005 (Unit: million US$) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
China, of which : 650 697 899 624 550 609 650 410 370 480 737 738 1024 1377 1580 
Export 86 156 297 199 64 62 120 60 50 30 167 271 396 582 499 
Import 525 541 602 425 486 547 530 350 320 450 571 467 628 795 1081 
General trade - - - - - - - - - - - - 452 641 826 
Processing on 
commission trade 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 55 57 73 
Border trade - - 304 - - - 210 130 100 130 369 352 196 300 441 
Bonded area trade - - - - - - - - - - - - 299 342 180 
Aid - - - - - - - - - - - - 11 15 38 
Others - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 22 22 
North Hamgyeong 
province 
97 218 471 454 150 116 105 - - - - - - - - 
% DPRK trade 3.7 8.5 17.8 21.6 7.3 5.8 4.8 - - - - - - - - 
Export to China 48 98 229 250 89 76 37 - - - - - - - - 
Import from China 44 120 242 204 61 40 24 - - - - - - - - 
Jilin 
province* 
Import - - - - - - - 41.2 47.6 48.6 15.0 12.5 12.4 18.0 20.7 
Export - - - - - - - 19.3 17.0 20.8 24.2 23.8 25.5 25.7 22.6 
Liaoning 
province 
Import - - - - - - - 43.1 42.9 40.5 67.7 80.4 81.6 66.8 48.9 
Export - - - - - - - 37.5 36.2 31.9 30.3 28.9 24.5 26.0 29.9 
Heilongjiang 
province 
Import - - - - - - - 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.6 
Export - - - - - - - 12.9 15.2 16.0 16.1 17.6 15.6 11.9 12.7 
South Korea 111 173 187 195 287 252 308 251 310 425 403 642 724 697 1056 
Russia 365 312 222 95 85 65 85 65 56 46 68 80 118 213 232 
Japan 508 482 472 494 595 518 - 439 337 426 474 369 265 252 194 
Southeast Asia - - - - - - - - - - 287 407 412 520 409 
EU countries - - - - - - - - - - - - - 261 292 
Others - - - - - - - - - - 702 633 572 226 294 
Total 2584 2555 2646 2100 2052 1976 2177 1442 1480 1970 2673 2902 3115 3554 4045 
Sources: KOTRA, Ministry of Unification, Kim (2001), Dunqiu (2006), Yoon (2006) 
* Trade figures with Chinese provinces represent the share (%) in total DPRK imports or exports with China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
Table 6: Seaborne activity of Rajin port, 1985-2005 (Unit: 000s DWT unless indicated) 
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Total 243 281 451 261 168 68 273 754 368 340 70 22 83 20 42 133 61 65 133 117 149 
% DPRK 3.1 3.2 5.5 3.9 2.5 1.0 4.1 17.1 9.1 7.4 1.8 0.5 1.6 0.5 0.7 2.2 0.9 1.8 3.3 3.3 2.4 
% East coast 4.6 5.0 9.3 7.2 5.1 2.1 9.6 37.6 20.1 19.1 5.2 2.0 6.1 2.4 1.7 5.8 2.4 6.1 12.8 15.0 10.8 
China 0 29 120 136 57 32 13 85 6 56 17 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 
Japan 178 186 256 60 101 28 225 573 191 46 29 0 53 14 32 109 43 40 51 13 48 
ROK 0 0 0 0 7 0 14 25 6 18 0 12 0 6 6 11 12 1 0 6 0 
Russia 19 56 44 36 3 0 21 20 160 0 0 0 14 0 3 13 6 19 50 89 101 
SE Asia 13 0 0 29 0 8 0 36 0 150 24 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 31 0 0 
Other 34 11 31 0 0 0 0 14 5 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
General 
Cargo 
102 141 208 111 32 9 102 259 27 13 11 16 24 10 19 64 29 13 63 52 6 
Container & 
Ro-Ro 
0 0 0 23 17 12 0 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 14 50 
Solid Bulks 28 0 34 0 34 14 42 125 129 157 24 0 14 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 18 
Liquid Bulks 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Nb. ships 18 23 29 24 10 5 18 33 16 7 3 2 6 2 5 14 8 12 25 34 39 
% DPRK 4.7 5.6 8.3 7.1 3.0 1.6 5.4 12.5 7.2 2.7 1.5 0.7 1.3 0.6 1.4 3.7 2.0 3.5 5.6 7.4 5.0 
< 4499 5 3 4 0 2 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 12 7 11 21 32 37 
< 14999 13 20 20 23 7 4 16 28 14 3 2 2 5 1 1 1 1 0 3 2 1 
< 50000 0 0 5 1 1 0 2 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
TEUs 368 112 165 436 150 336 1830 587 3118 0 562 0 422 0 300 1053 438 0 748 165 165 
% DPRK 5.2 1.1 1.4 4.0 1.7 2.4 14.7 5.4 37.7 0.0 8.2 0.0 6.6 0.0 2.5 12.2 3.0 0.0 4.7 0.8 0.9 
Source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
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Figure 1: A matrix of centrality and intermediacy applied to port cities 
 
 
 
Source: modified from C. Ducruet, 2004 
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Figure 2: The North Korean transport system 
 
Source: compiled from various sources 
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Figure 3: Spatial organization and industrial potentials of Rajin and Seonbong city-regions 
 
Source: modified from Atlas of North Korea (1997) 
 
Figure 4: Population evolution by province and city  
 
Source: Jo and Adler (2002); Helders (2006) 
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Figure 5: Maritime trade between North and South Korea in 2000 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Unification in South Korea 
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Figure 6: Regional distribution of Rajin port‟s foreland by port and period, 1985-2005 
 
Source: Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
 
